Abstract

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom.

Highlights

  • Scientific realism has long dominated the ontological arena of contemporary philosophy in terms of the number of proponents and adversaries

  • Unlike the traditional anti-realist, idealist and instrumentalist critics of scientific realism, the anti-representationalists advocate a stance that is not merely non-realist, but anti-metaphysical: in Rorty’s and Price’s view, the whole project of philosophical ontology is torn between these untenable alternatives

  • Fallibilism and the form of realism it entails in our assertoric practices has escaped the attention of the contemporary antirepresentationalists, Rorty and Price

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Summary

Introduction

Scientific realism has long dominated the ontological arena of contemporary philosophy in terms of the number of proponents and adversaries It is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and, more recently, Huw Price. Drawing from the notion of science and the scientific method developed by the founder of pragmatism, Charles S Peirce, this hypothetical realism (as I will call it) does not entail that scientific ontological commitments are privileged, and has no need for an argument to that effect. I will conclude by proposing that the anti-representationalists’ rejection of ontology is not quite successful Even if their criticism of traditional versions of scientific realism, which entail a strong view of the privilege of scientific ontological commitment, is successful—as I am ready to allow—the anti-representationalists should accept at least one ontological thesis: hypothetical realism

Anti-representationalism and scientific realism
Pragmatism and hypothetical realism
Fallibilism and assertoric practices
Conclusion
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