Abstract
Abstract This chapter discusses “realist pluralism” in mathematics and morality. It argues that, under the assumption of pluralism, factual questions get deflated while practical -- i.e., what-to-do -- questions do not. It then uses this contrast to formulate a radicalization of Moore’s Open Question Argument. Practical questions remain open even when the facts, including the evaluative facts, come cheaply. The chapter concludes that practical realism must be false, but practical questions are objective in a paradigmatic respect. Conversely, mathematical realism is true, but mathematical questions fail to be objective. An important upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
