Realism. for Real this Time: Scientific Realism is not a Compromise between Positivism and Interpretivism

Abstract

Within the fields of international relations (IR) and political science, philosophical realism (from here, ‘realism’) and scientific realism (SR) have been understood primarily through the highly influential works of Alexander Wendt. Given all the attention Wendt has received,1 scientific realists in IR might be happy with the well-known introduction to SR that he has provided to such an extensive audience. But this coverage has come with a great deal of discomfort for many scientific realists because of Wendt’s representation of SR as a compromise, or a ‘Via Media’, between positivism and interpretivism (2006: 182). In other words, while Wendt’s overall project of making ‘the study of ideas in international politics ... scientifically respectable’ (2000: 165) has been tremendously successful, it has produced the impression that the content and implications of SR are primarily a compromise between positivism and interpretivism, which results in an unfortunate misunderstanding. While such a compromise may be tenable, and, for some, attractive, this chapter will argue that it should not be seen as the primary understanding of SR. By doing so, it will present alternative understandings on SR’s crucial positions regarding ontology and epistemology, as well as the implications of these positions for scientific realist understandings of the relationship between structure and agency, thus highlighting the real advantages of SR and its difference from positivism and interpretivism.