Realism and unrealism: a reply

Abstract

A recent article by Hammarberg (1982) criticizes my theoretical perspective on coarticulation as both “internally” and “externally incoherent”. A major source of incoherence, in Hammarberg’s view, is the alleged claim that phonetic segments are physical entities, and hence, not mental entities. The present paper ascribes the incoherence largely to Hammarberg’s understanding of the perspective, pointing out that entities can be at once psychological (“mental”) and physical. More usefully, perhaps, the article attempts to establish the philosophical, theoretical and practical grounds on which Hammarberg’s own viewpoint and mine disagree most importantly. It is argued that the disagreements are substantial (mirroring, in part, those recently expressed between Fodor & Pylyshyn (1981) and Turvey et al . (1981)), and that their analysis may lead to more careful development of both theoretical perspectives; this should, in turn, promote a deeper understanding of speech itself.