Abstract

Abstract The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.

Highlights

  • In this paper, I propose a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science

  • Section (5) introduces a robust sense of epistemic objectivity on which a belief is epistemically justified in an objective sense if it is based on a truth-conducive methodological norm

  • The reliabilist approach to the warrant of methodological norms that I have just outlined enables us to conceive of epistemic objectivity in a more substantive sense than the minimal sense considered in the previous section

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Summary

Introduction

I propose a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. The aim of the paper is to develop an account of epistemic objectivity that is suited to a realist conception of scientific inquiry. Section (3) introduces the topic by way of T.S. Kuhn’s discussion of subjectivity and objectivity in the context of multiple scientific values. Section (4) argues that Kuhn’s discussion provides at most a minimal sense of objectivity on which the values play a neutral role, though their relation to truth is left unaccounted for. Section (5) introduces a robust sense of epistemic objectivity on which a belief is epistemically justified in an objective sense if it is based on a truth-conducive methodological norm. Section (7) explores the way in which judgement between competing norms may involve the exercise of cognitive virtues which import objective elements into the subjective sphere. Section (8) summarizes the discussion and raises questions for future work

Objectivity
Minimal Objectivity
Robust Objectivity
Subjective Elements
A Role for Virtue
Summary and Future Work
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