Realism and Semantics

Abstract

The volume contains three papers on realism: Nicholas Rescher'* Conceptual Schemes, Simon Blackburn's Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory, and Joseph Margolis' Cognitive Issues in the Realist-Idealist Dispute. Rescher represents one regrettable trend in contemporary discussions of realism, Blackburn another. Margolis struggles with both trends. Margolis starts well with clear statement of and the epistemic problems it poses. He rightly describes current versions of realism as Kantian-like (373). His discussion of Kuhn (374-376) is illuminating. We might put the position it reveals as follows: insofar as there is world independent of our theories, it is mere Kantian thing-in-itself, beyond reach of knowledge or reference. Such world is one that Nelson Goodman would say is iorth fighting for ([18]: 20). There is strong trend toward just this sort of amongst contemporary epistemologists. Rescher exemplifies this trend. He begins his paper by arguing effectively that Donald Davidson [5] is wrong to reject the very idea of conceptual scheme. He goes on to consider how conceptual schemes can differ. They embody different theories. . . about different things. To move from one conceptual scheme to another is in some way to change the subject. The difference does not lie in disagreement and conflict (331). It is a matter of difference in orientation rather than one of disagreement in doctrine (333). After much of this, and approving references to Feyerabend (332), Goodman (336) and Rorty (337) Rescher claims that it is inappropriate to say that there is an identifiable something . .. that is prior to and independent of any and all scheme-based conceptualization (337).