Abstract
This chapter focuses on the relationship between realism and intentionality. It compares the solutions proposed by Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureoli, and William Ockham to the problem of the relationship between first intention and an extra-mental thing. The chapter reconstructs Hervaeus's theory of intentionality by reconstructing the debate held in Paris between Hervaeus and Aureoli at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The point of reference will be Dominik Perler's introduction to the edition of Aureoli's Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum , dist. 23. Hervaeus's theory of intentionality is not more realistic than Aureoli's because it provides an extra-mental foundation of universal concepts or first intentions, as Perler thinks, but because it is more inclined to consider the interaction between the subject knower and the object known as the result of two linked, but quite independent, epistemological items, i.e. the cognized thing and the intentional property of being an intention or being cognized. Keywords: Dominik Perler; extra-mental foundation; Hervaeus Natalis; intentionality; Peter Aureoli; realism; Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum ; universal concepts; William Ockham
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