Abstract
The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naive account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other. In order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
