Real Predicates and ‘Exists’

Abstract

Kant's claim that 'exists' is not a 'real predicate' is well known. His reasons for so claiming are not, however, and he has recently been accused by Jerome Shaffer of inconsistency in the account he gives of existential judgements. In this note I want to defend Kant's claim and show how it can be rendered consistent with his general doctrines concerning predication. Further, I believe general theoretical grounds can be discerned as to why he thinks 'exists' is not a real predicate. Shaffer's attack turns on pointing out what admittedly looks like an inconsistency in Kant's position in that he holds both that existential judgements are synthetic and that 'exists' is not a real predicate. The apparent conflict between these two doctrines emerges from the characterisations given to 'synthetic' and 'real'. The relevant propositions are the following: