Abstract
Credit conditions have caused real estate booms and busts, owing to an underpricing of credit risk aided by regulatory arbitrage and shadow financing. Across countries, real estate price and credit bubbles have reflected not only inelastic land supply and thin trading, but also the amplification of shocks via backward‐looking price expectations and financing based on distorted prices. Macroprudential lessons from the Great Crisis include preventing excess real estate financing and limiting the amplification and correlation of risks. Nonetheless, the costs and benefits of recent regulations require re‐evaluation amid an ongoing need to address correlated risks from shadow financing and securitization. (JEL G28, E3, R31, R33, R38)
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