Reactors-related utilization options of weapons plutonium being released from the defence program

Abstract

The release of considerable amounts of fissile materials has once again drawn the attention of politicians, scientists and the public to the nuclear problem, as has often been the case in the past when nuclear arms were being developed and tested. An essentially new factor which makes the current status of relations different from the former ‘cold war’ years is the spirit of openness and collaboration between states in response to this problem. It is known that Russia and the United States have differing viewpoints concerning the most dangerous material—plutonium, though recently there has been a perceptible convergence of their respective positions. Russia from the very beginning has planned the separation of civil plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel and utilization of the former in nuclear reactors for electricity production. In this case the handling of surplus weapons plutonium can be considered as an additional episode in the nuclear power development strategy. In the United States, on the contrary, following the rejection of the policy of separating and recycling civil plutonium, the surplus weapons plutonium handling program is being considered, as a matter of fact, separately from the national nuclear power program. That is why burial in geological formations has been considered for a long time as the only principal method for disposal of surplus weapons plutonium. Nevertheless, recently, to a considerable degree thanks to the position of Russian scientists, the United States has had to recognize the expedience of utilization of weapons plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for light water reactors, in addition to the burial option. Presently in Russia various ways of surplus weapons plutonium utilization in fast and in thermal reactors are being considered. From the practical point of view, the most important question for each of the options is the amount of weapons plutonium utilized and the respective costs ratio. Preliminary analysis has shown that the extent of costs for weapons plutonium utilization for any of the options depends upon employment of new or partially constructed installations. In cases where only existing or to be upgraded installations are used, the costs look real enough. Employment of new or partially constructed installations will increase the total cost on principle to a new level. This factor is especially important for reactor variants of plutonium management, which include, as a minimum, two installations—the MOX fuel fabrication plant and the nuclear reactor itself.