Reactions to Three Types of Distributive Injustice

Abstract

Recent formulations of distributive justice or equity theory are examined. It is suggested that the basic differences, and indeed difficulties, of these formulations lie in the manner in which social comparisons have been conceptualized. It is proposed that as a result of these conceptual problems, existing formulations account for only a small number of the many possible types of injustice situations. A conceptual elaboration of distributive justice theory is presented. It is demonstrated that within what has previously been recognized as one type of distributive injustice there are many other possible types of injustice states. An examination of one of the many related propositional elaborations is presented. An hypothesis derived from this proposition is tested in one cognitive and one experimental study. This hypothesis proposes that individuals will differentially define and respond to previously unrecognized injustice states. The results of both studies clearly indicate that individuals do differentially define and respond to the injustice states manipulated. The methodological implications of this work along with its implications for future theoretical development in distributive injustice and equity theory are discussed.