Reaction networks and evolutionary game theory

Abstract

The powerful mathematical tools developed for the study of large scale reaction networks have given rise to applications of this framework beyond the scope of biochemistry. Recently, reaction networks have been suggested as an alternative way to model social phenomena. In this "socio-chemical metaphor" molecular species play the role of agents' decisions and their outcomes, and chemical reactions play the role of interactions among these decisions. From here, it is possible to study the dynamical properties of social systems using standard tools of biochemical modelling. In this work we show how to use reaction networks to model systems that are usually studied via evolutionary game theory. We first illustrate our framework by modeling the repeated prisoners' dilemma. The model is built from the payoff matrix together with assumptions of the agents' memory and recognizability capacities. The model provides consistent results concerning the performance of the agents, and allows for the examination of the steady states of the system in a simple manner. We further develop a model considering the interaction among Tit for Tat and Defector agents. We produce analytical results concerning the performance of the strategies in different situations of agents' memory and recognizability. This approach unites two important theories and may produce new insights in classical problems such as the evolution of cooperation in large scale systems.