Re‐forming the state? Kleptocracy & the political transition in Kenya

Abstract

Kenya's general election of December 1997 saw the return of President Daniel Arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) but has inaugurated a period of intense political fluidity. On the one hand, the ruling party won the election, but its sense of vulnerability has been reinforced by widespread recognition that a less divided opposition could have displaced it. On the other, apparent acceptance by the President of a 1992 constitutional amendment which dictates that his re‐election would signal his last term of office has precipitated a struggle around the succession. In turn, the uncertainty has been compounded by the fact that, prior to the election, the government was forced to concede a political reform package which not only partially corrected the imbalance in the electoral rules which systematically favoured the ruling party, but which also conceded that these changes would lead on to an open‐ended review of the constitution starting in the new year (Southall, 1998). The immediate outcome has been dramatic, for whilst Moi has been casting around to shore up the increasingly shaky foundations of his regime, rivals for the presidency have begun to jockey for position and the opposition parties to re‐assess their options and relations to both KANU and each other. Additionally, the political class as a whole has been shaken by a series of financial scandals which threatens its control over an increasingly troubled economy. In short, whilst the new fluidity suggests some opportunity for a genuine democratic opening, the situation is also fraught with the danger of a simultaneous collapse of the state and of the ramshackle foundations which sustain it. Yet even if Kenya does pull off a ‘successful’ transition, it does not follow that this will matched by the arrival of a new government able and willing to confront the political roots of the economy's stagnation.