Re-assertion of Elite Control in Masoka’s Wildlife Program, Zimbabwe

Shylock Muyengwa,Brian Child

doi:10.5539/jsd.v10n6p28

Abstract

Local level governance is crucial in delivering benefits of conservation to communities. This paper provides a historical review of the evolution of governance and the emergence of elite capture in Masoka’s wildlife program in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2011. Fifty-four key informant interviews and reviews of numerous secondary data sources analyzed in order to understand accountability mechanisms, collective decision-making, and the allocation of wildlife revenues into various local initiatives. The local narratives and secondary data suggested that the governance had flipped from one of impersonal and democratic rule to one based on personal rule of traditional leaders. These outcomes were in part a result of the shift in meso level structures that previously supported the program structures at community level, the shifting national politics that led to increased sense of enfranchisement and impunity among traditional leaders, and non-merit based system of appointing committee members. The results suggest that locally elected committees when left at the peril of strong and unchecked powers of traditional leaders they are bound to collapse. Second, the findings also indicate that in the absence of weak land tenure rights, locals have no “teeth” to challenge tradition-based authorities in order to demand for accountable governance. We conclude that given such condition of weak tenure and access to resource rights, local democratic institutions do not emerge naturally even if most people want them and if not protected from outside, they are bound to fail and superseded by personalized ones.

Highlights

Masoka’s Wildlife Management program was considered a robust and successful case of a local wildlife managing community in Zimbabwe judged by data (N. Nabane and Matzke, 1997; Matzke and Nabane, 1996)
Between 2009 and 2011 it lost its impersonal and institutionalized rule as the elite centralized the governance of CAMPFIRE benefits
The exertion of elite control that occurred in Masoka is a common feature of nascent local level democratic Community based natural resources management (CBNRM) institutions

Summary

Introduction

Masoka’s Wildlife Management program was considered a robust and successful case of a local wildlife managing community in Zimbabwe judged by data (e.g. high wildlife populations, increased income to community, and relatively high number of community funded projects) (N. Nabane and Matzke, 1997; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). Masoka’s Wildlife Management program was considered a robust and successful case of a local wildlife managing community in Zimbabwe judged by data (e.g. high wildlife populations, increased income to community, and relatively high number of community funded projects) The retrospective opinions of people interviewed between 2007 and 2009 (Taylor and Murphree, 2007a; Taylor, 2009) indicated that Masoka was a successful Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) project managed through an impersonal and institutionalized governance system that delivered development and cash benefits to its members(Murombedzi, 1997; Taylor, 2007). Between 2009 and 2011 it lost its impersonal and institutionalized rule as the elite centralized the governance of CAMPFIRE benefits. This paper explores how and why these changes took place in Masoka between 2009 and 2011 in order to understand the complex interactions among the elite and non-elite in the allocation of resources

Results

Discussion

Conclusion