Re Alex

Abstract

In April 2004, the Family Court was called upon to determine whether gender reassignment treatment was in the best interests of a child named Alex. In determining any person’s interests, it is necessary to know who that person is and whose interests are at stake. This is even more difficult where the interest at stake concerns a person’s identity. In order to determine whether gender reassignment was in Alex’s interests, the court was required to determine how the question of gender related to who Alex was. In short, the court had to deploy a theory of identity. This article will argue that the process and the reasoning behind the judgment demonstrate the deployment of a practical and discursive conception of identity (specifically, a narrative self-constitution view), rather than an essentialist view according to which gender identity is regarded as a direct expression of bodily sex. In coming to his judgment, the Chief Justice demonstrated a critical sensitivity and responsivity to the discursive nature and social context of identity by facilitating a dialogical account of Alex’s situation and, ultimately, gender identity.