Raz on well-being

Abstract

One reason why Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom is so important is that Raz has come closer to the truth about political morality than have other recent political theorists.' His account of well-being is no exception. Modem political theory has been marked by tendencies to play down the role of well-being, and to work with accounts of well-being which exaggerate the importance of the satisfaction of desire. Raz displays neither of these tendencies, and this has implications for the whole of his political theory. In particular, of course, Raz shows how liberalism can be combined with recognition by the state that some ways of life are objectively better than others. I applaud also many of the distinctions which Raz draws between the interest of individual agents and morality, and his acceptance of pluralism and the importance of autonomy in an account of well-being. In this paper, however, I shall show that certain parts of Raz's position on well-being-parts Raz himself thinks quite central-require serious modification. He should give an individual's own goals a smaller role in explaining well-being, and good-making characteristics a larger one; he makes activity, as opposed to passivity, too important; he implausibly makes the value of one's own well-being dependent upon one's beliefs and desires; he exaggerates the significance of 'action reasons' and social forms; and he should accept both that well-being and morality may seriously conflict and that well-being and autonomy are less dependent on morality than he suggests. I shall not have time in this paper to go into all the details of the implications for political theory of my suggested revisions to Raz's views. But I shall end with a brief discussion of what I take to be one of the most important of these implications.