Abstract
By using the test score of the least able student in a classroom as the objective function (Rawlsian optimum), this paper examines the implications for teachers' incentives and compares them with the objective that uses the average test score of all the students in a classroom (utilitarian optimum). We show that for certain human-capital production functions and teachers' effort cost functions, the Rawlsian optimum yields at least the same average human capital as the utilitarian optimum, but that the resulting distribution of human capital under the former is more equitable than that under the latter.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
