Rawlsian Individuals: From the 'Lab' to Adaptation

Abstract

John Rawls', A Theory of Justice, project of arguing from individuals to social outcomes is examined from the perspective of experimental methods in economics and complex adaptive systems simulations. The first section discusses the book's main argument regarding the original position, and the justice principle selection process is explained as Rawls' representation of a hypothetical experiment. This hypothetical experiment, however, falls short of satisfying reasonable experimental controls, particularly as reflects the conception of the individual it employs. The second section of the paper then goes beyond the usual focus on Rawls' original position argument, and discusses the differences between his conception of rational persons in the first and third parts of the book, associated with his distinction between thin and full theories of the good. The third section uses his fuller conception of rational persons in the third part of the book to offer an alternative view of the selection process understood as a complex adaptive system. The fourth section turns to a topic raised by this alternative complex system approach, namely, the status of normative reasoning in political-economic systems. The fifth section gives brief summary remarks.