Abstract
Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of normative theorising. This paper offers a complementary methodology to the method of reflective equilibrium, referred to as Rawlsian constructivism, which brings forth its practical merits. With the support of Rawlsian constructivism, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes a tool for public reasoning about practical problems which aims to facilitate shared solutions. The process of reflective scrutiny is used, not in the search of moral truth, but rather to highlight what stands in the way of solutions to problems agents face in different domains of social life. The practical value lies in scrutinising reasons for action that are taken for granted, explicating new rationales for action and highlighting neglected points of agreement. The paper exemplifies this approach with a process of justifying individual obligations to combat climate change. Normative theorists who share the practical agenda have correctly noted the importance of bottom-up investigations of subject domains. This paper argues that the next step should be to utilise this version of the method of reflective equilibrium to explore the potential for morally progressive solutions to these problems.
Highlights
Many of those working in practical ethics and political philosophy want their work to make a practical difference, perhaps even that it contributes to a better world
We argue that the method of reflective equilibrium can be used to strike the desired balance between practical relevance and thorough criticism, and that it is thereby an appropriate method for doing practical ethics
Rawlsian constructivism supplies the tools for constructing such a bridge. We have addressed those practical ethicists who share the ambition of making a practical difference
Summary
Many of those working in practical ethics and political philosophy want their work to make a practical difference, perhaps even that it contributes to a better world. One way to realise such an ambition is by applying moral principles to real and concrete practical problems and to deduce relatively specific action-recommendations. Cohen 2008; Fabre 2012; cf List and Valentini 2016: 543–544) This top-down approach to practical philosophy has, been subject to extensive criticism over the past decade or so. Legitimacy and democracy, they say, fail to guide action and do not address concrete injustices agents face in the real world. In these discussions an alternative ideal of practical difference-making has emerged. Practical reality must be reformed from within, through non-ideal theories of justice, political realism and practice-dependent or interpretive methods
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