Rawls, law-making and liberal democratic toleration: from Theory to Political Liberalism to The Law of Peoples

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this essay I situate Rawls’s conception of liberal democratic toleration within the account of political and law-making activity undertaken by free equals that he develops across his three main monographs. In doing so, I draw special attention to two overlooked features of Rawls’s case for liberal democratic toleration. The first concerns the relationship between Rawls’s account of moral development and the revised account of stability he develops in Political Liberalism and carries forward in The Law of Peoples. The second concerns the role played by his understanding of the scalar nature of the extra-legal normative force normally carried by law and legal obligation. Taken together these two features render Rawls’s conception of liberal democratic toleration deeper, richer and more promising than critics have acknowledged. I conclude with a brief thought as to what may, behind the scenes, be driving many critics.