Abstract
In this paper, we analyze two nested iterative solution procedures for infinite, dynamic games of incomplete information. These procedures do not rely on the specification of a type space à la Harsanyi. Weak rationalizability is characterized by common certainty of rationality at the beginning of the game. Strong rationalizability also incorporates a notion of forward induction. The solutions may take as given some exogenous restrictions on players' conditional beliefs. In dynamic games, strong rationalizability is a refinement of weak rationalizability. Existence, regularity properties, and equivalence with the set of iteratively interim undominated strategies are proved under standard assumptions. The analysis mainly focus on two-player games with observable actions, but we show how to extend it to n-player games with imperfectly observable actions. Finally, we briefly survey some applications of the proposed approach.
Published Version
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