Abstract
This article investigateS epistemic conditions for a sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know that all players maximize own expected payoffs for any information sets in their final decisions, then their behaviors with belief yield a sequential equilibrium. This result is an extension of [2] in a perfect information game In this article, we propose the notion of μ-rationality, by which we mean that player knows that he maximizes his own payoff according to the common-belief μ. We also introduce the notion of μ-consistency in imperfect information game. Our main theorem states that mutual knowledge of both μ-rationality and μ-consistency induces a sequential equilibrium outcome in an extensive form game.
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