Rationality, Ethical Codes, and an Egalitarian Justification of Ethical Expertise

Abstract

In order to understand the nature of ethical evaluation as promoted by ethical codes and as practiced by ethicists, we need to understand the notions of rationality and judgment in terms of which codes are developed and ethical pronouncements are made. Although this paper focuses on what might be called “professional contexts” of ethical evaluation, the proposed view of rationality and judgment is argued to be common to all defensible ethical judgments. The paper begins by examining a classical interpretation of rationality which asserts that rational judgments are universal, necessary, and rule-guided. This is contrasted with a more robust and arguably superior view of rationality articulated by Norman Brown. Brown argues that rational judgments are neither universal, necessary, nor rule-guided. This non-classical view implies that ethical judgments are rational and can be justified in the same way that judgments in law and medicine can be justified. However, if ethics is not a matter of following rules, the very possibility of ethical codes is in doubt. A brief survey of some standard objections to ethical codes shows that they often tacitly rely on the non-classical sense of rationality to show that ethical codes are defective in the way just described: that is, as instruments designed to promote rote, non-rational behavior, codes cannot promote the rational responses that form the core of ethical behavior. However, a closer look at ethical codes reveals that they are not sets of rules. On the contrary, many codes are designed to promote the very kind of non-classical rational judgment that critics argue codes cannot promote. As a result, many of the standard objections to codes are misguided. Yet, this analysis does not suggest that codes are problem free, but rather that their problems are different from what has been traditionally thought. One apparent problem of this analysis is that the similarity of ethical reasoning to legal and medical reasoning suggests that there are ethical experts just as there are legal and medical experts. Although the notion of ethical expertise is one that is thought to be elitist and oppressive, I argue that there is a defensible analysis of ethical expertise that is fundamentally egalitarian. Finally, some ramifications of this analysis are suggested for organizational ethical codes and the practice of business ethics consulting. It is suggested that organizations can play a crucial role in solving some of the most pressing social problems we have, such as those concerning race and gender.