Abstract
The incentive and monitoring problems in Chinese collective farming are theoretically reformulated so that the uneasy position of collective managers concerning the adequate levels of work compensation and collective accumulation can be taken fully into account in determining the quantitative intensity of labor mobilization. It is argued that there was a motive for collective managers not to engage themselves in excessive mobilization of peasant labor if they were at all concerned about maintaining adequate wage levels, collective accumulation, and even their own income and positional benefits. The rationality of the managerial behavior on Chinese collective farms should thus be judged in view of the specific conditions imposed by the state on peasant interests.
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