Abstract
Traditional accounts of rationality typically preclude metaphorical reasoning. We review research that has highlighted the pervasiveness of metaphors in creative problem solving, jurisprudence and history of science, and argue that any account of rationality must explicitly acknowledge the ontology of representation and include an ontology-changing mechanism. From these considerations, we present an interaction-based view of cognition and examine the problem of rationality in its terms. We argue that rationality is closely related to the attitude of a cognitive agent towards incoherency—by which we do not mean internal inconsistency but operational incongruity in the external world. We conclude that though rationality permits a change of ontology, it requires a healthy respect towards the autonomous structure of the environment.
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