Rationality and Culture: Behavior within the Family as a Case Study

Abstract

To many philosophers, as to the Past Master himself who formulated it, the Categorical Imperative enshrined the core sense of 'rationality' in its practical aspect-the aspect with which I am primarily concerned. The claim to this status seems legitimate, for common sense and philosophy alike would grant that as rational beings we must recognize the inconsistency of adopting a moral principle for others, while refusing to adopt the same for ourselves. Still, the 'universalizability' and 'logical consistency' which are its underpinnings do not give an adequate account of the rationality of behavior. Suppose we do universalize the maxim enjoining repayment of borrowed money, for a refusal to repay would be inconsistent insofar as it would eventually lead to the abolishing of moneylending itself. But, for all we know, this may be considered good by some social reformers. The same difficulty arises if we apply the imperative to assess behavior vis-a-vis the family. If, for instance, the family is 'the foundation of human society' and does in essence refer to a socially patterned institution concerned with biological and cultural survival, then it does seem inconsistent to strive for the survival of the rational species, and deny at the same time the universality of an institution and the practices pertaining to it which make possible biological and culture survival. But is 'family' a natural unit-the sole biologically given means for procreation and child rearing, the purpose which presumably earns for it this universality? Bertrand Russell reported the existence of a monogamic among civilized mankind and even among anthropoid apes. He stressed nevertheless the legal aspect of the institution among humans.' So, what could be called a natural unit prima facie having its genesis in natural instinct was after all a social invention not very different ... from other social inventions ... say the Corporation or the University, and no more permanent than these.2 One could say, of course, that diverse social interventions do not forfeit the claim to universalizability, for all social behavior is controlled on a fixed biological basis. Still, this does not quash qualms about the effective applicability of Kant's Imperative. First, the thesis about the same genetic makeup governing all human behavior is dubious, unable to explain satisfactorily the stark fact of cultural divergence. Even when this thesis is refined by eminent sociobiologists like E. O. Wilson and C. J. Lumsden, who allow the mutual interplay of genes and culture, talking of gene-culture co-evolution,3 the prospect of applying Kant's Imperative does not improve. A cultureChhanda Gupta