Rationality alters the rank between peer punishment and social exclusion

Abstract

Peer punishment and social exclusion are two ways to punish free-riders. Previous work usually focuses on how their presence, either peer punishment or social exclusion, shapes the evolution of cooperation. Little attention has been given to which of these two strategies is favored by natural selection when they are both present. Here we investigate how rationality alters the ranking of these two strategies. Under weak rationality, for compulsory public goods games, peer punishment has an evolutionary advantage over social exclusion if the efficiency of punishment or the cost of exclusion is high. Furthermore, this rank is preserved for voluntary public goods games where loners are involved. Under strong rationality, however, peer punishment cannot prevail over social exclusion for both compulsory and voluntary public goods games. This indicates that rationality greatly alters the rank between peer punishment and social exclusion. Moreover, we find that this ranking is sensitive to the rationality. Our work thus gives an insight into how different types of punishment evolve.