Abstract
This chapter concerns a reflection principle discussed by David Christensen and Adam Elga according to which a rational agent’s credence in ϕ ought to be his or her expectation of the ideal credence for the agent, which is the degree to which the evidence ideally supports ϕ. The principle seems to have paradoxical consequences, illustrated in its application to an example to which the title of this chapter refers, but it is argued that the paradox arises from mistaken assumptions about what determines the agent’s epistemic situation. The principle may still need qualification, and it needs to be reconciled with the possibility of epistemic modesty (uncertainty about whether one’s credences are ideal), but the clock paradox can be dissolved, and doing so helps to clarify issues concerning higher-order evidence.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
