Rational hope, possibility, and divine action

Abstract

One of the arguments for which Kant is best known (or most notorious) is the so-called “moral proof” of the existence of God, freedom, and the immortal soul. Versions of the proof can be found in each of the Critiques, in various lectures, and in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. “Proof” has to be taken loosely here, since the attitude licensed by moral considerations, for Kant, is not knowledge but rather Belief (Glaube). Still, loose talk of “proof” is appropriate insofar as the argument is supposed tomotivate not mere Belief or faith but rather “rational Belief (Vernunftglaube)” – i.e. assent that is justified in a non-epistemic way for finite practical agents. Kant is hardly advocating an irrationalist leap into dogmatic or mystical fancy. Because the moral proof is so well-known, and because at least two of its objects are broadly religious – God and the immortal soul – it comes as a surprise when he indicates in a 1793 letter to the theologian C. F. Staudlin that such Belief is not the main focus of the philosophy of religion. It’s really moral philosophy that deals with Belief; philosophy of religion, in contrast,