Abstract
This chapter challenges the scepticism of Brian Skyrms and some others about the notion of common knowledge in game theory. According to Skyrms, rational choice and common knowledge of rationality are in some situations incompatible. Focusing on the Centipede Game rather than the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the essay rejects the assumption that for an agent to choose rationally she must maximize her expected utility, and argues that in situations like Centipede, where one expects one’s mode of deliberation to affect the actions of others, reciprocation can be rational. If this view is correct, then rational choice and common knowledge of rationality can exist in mutual harmony.
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