RATIONAL CAPACITY AS A CONDITION ON BLAME

Abstract

Suppose that a particular woman intentionally takes a drink. To provide an evaluative context, suppose she ought not to have another because she will then be unfit to fulfill some of her obligations. Preanalytically, most of us would insist on the possibility and significance of the following three descriptions of the case: (1) the reckless or self-indulgent case; (2) the weak case; and (3) the compulsive case. In (1), the woman knows what she is doing but accepts the consequences. Her choice is to get drunk or risk getting drunk. She acts in accordance with her judgment. In (2) the woman knowingly takes the drink contrary to her (conscious) better judgment; the explanation for this lack of self-control is that she is weak-willed. In (3), she knowingly takes the drink contrary to her better judgment, but she is the victim of a compulsive (irresistible) desire to drink. (41–42) Distinguishing these three categories is important, because they are thought to license different responses to the drinker. While we blame both the reckless drinker and the weak-willed drinker, we do so in different ways, or for different things; the compulsive drinker, on the other hand, is excused in virtue of her compulsion. Although matters of moral importance thus hang on distinguishing these cases, providing a way to distinguish them proves difficult. Watson believes that both the weak-willed and the compulsive drinker act contrary to their better judgment. This distinguishes them from the reckless drinker. Distinguishing them from one another proves more difficult. In a natural first attempt, one might claim that the weak-willed drinker could have resisted the temptation while the compelled drinker could not have—she was compelled. This is a preprint. The final version can be found in Philosophical Books 48, no. 2 (April 2007): 109–123.