Rational Belief, Probability and the Justification of Inductive Inference

Abstract

The argument presented in this paper is devoted to a critical analysis of a view on justification of inductive inference. This view has been first formulated by Keynes, and is represented in Polish literature by by J. Hossiason and M. Kokoszynska. The representatives of this view see the justification of inductive inferences in the rationality of the degree of belief in the conclusion, motivated by belief in the premises, or else in the rationality of reinforcing the degree of belief in the conclusion. In the definition of the justification of inductive inference they use the concept of probability introduced axiomatically; it is said of the probability of a sentence q with respect to a sentence P that it equals the degree of rational belief in the sentence q, motivated by the belief in the sentence p. The adherents to the concept under discussion have not always formulated their views completely. In my opinion, there is a need to try to make some concepts more precise, or to fill in some gaps of the reasoning. I have attempted —without changing the main line—to fill these gaps so that my criticism does not take advantage of minor inexactitudes in the main construction.