Rational behavior is a ‘double-edged sword’ when considering voluntary vaccination

Abstract

Of particular importance for public health is how to understand strategic vaccination behavior in social networks. Social learning is a central aspect of human behavior, and it thus shapes vaccination individuals’ decision-making. Here, we study two simple models to address the impact of the more rational decision-making of individuals on voluntary vaccination. In the first model, individuals are endowed with memory capacity for their past experiences of dealing with vaccination. In addition to their current payoffs, they also take account of the historical payoffs that are discounted by a memory-decaying factor. They use such overall payoffs (weighing the current payoffs and historical payoffs) to reassess their vaccination strategies. Those who have higher overall payoffs are more likely imitated by their social neighbors. In the second model, individuals do not blindly learn the strategies of neighbors; they also combine the fraction of infection in the past epidemic season. If the fraction of infection surpasses the perceived risk threshold, individuals will increase the probability of taking vaccination. Otherwise, they will decrease the probability of taking vaccination. Then we use evolutionary game theory to study the vaccination behavior of people during an epidemiological process. To do this, we propose a two-stage model: individuals make vaccination decisions during a yearly vaccination campaign, followed by an epidemic season. This forms a feedback loop between the vaccination decisions of individuals and their health outcomes, and thus payoffs. We find that the two more rational decision-making models have nontrivial impacts on the vaccination behavior of individuals, and, as a result, on the final fraction of infection. Our results highlight that, from an individual’s viewpoint, the decisions are optimal and more rational. However, from the social viewpoint, the strategies of individuals can give rise to distinct outcomes. Namely, the rational behavior of individuals plays a ‘double-edged-sword’ role on the social effects.