Rational and irrational bases of commitment to group hierarchies

Abstract

This paper draws on two theoretical perspectives — expectation states theory and Goffman's theory of the self and social interaction — to analyze the interactional dynamics by which status hierarchies are maintained. In accounting for the conservative tendencies of social hierarchies, I argue that the two perspectives rely on different principles. For expectation states theory, cognition — particularly performance expectations — is key. Established hierarchies tend to be preserved, according to this perspective, because group members believe that higher-status members are more competent than lower-status actors and act on these beliefs in ways that make them self-fulfilling. In Goffman's theory, actors' attachment to images of self and the normative pressures they feel to affirm others' images of self and to preserve an orderly flow of social interaction, are the primary motivational bases of actors' commitment to established social hierarchies. Whereas expectation states theory holds that hierarchies in task-group interaction express actual or expected inequalities of competence among group members, Goffman's analyses suggest that interaction in group processes may be more about affirming or defending established hierarchies that might otherwise rest on tenuous ground. I distinguish between “rational” and “irrational” bases of commitment to established hierarchies. The former refers to hierarchies in which the high status members are believed by most group members to be the most competent, the latter refers to hierarchies in which beliefs about the relative competence of group members have little bearing on members' standing within the group, but instead the maintenance of the hierarchy is driven more by norms, identities, and emotions.