Abstract
In Chapter 4, I argue that a proper understanding of practical truth improves our understanding of the goal of practical reasoning: acting well. It does so, first, by improving our understanding of what it means for rational motives, including wishes (boulêseis) and decisions (prohaireseis), to be “rational.” I argue that these are “rational” motives in that they express a concern for practical truth. Second, my account of practical truth transforms our understanding of rational action itself. I argue that when we act on our rational motives, these actions have a striking and under-appreciated feature: they are attempts to fit ourselves to the world. Just as a concern for truth expressed in thought involves trying to fit our thoughts to the way the world is, a concern for truth expressed in motivation and action involves trying to fit ourselves and our actions to what is good in the world.
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