Rating Prestige: Status‐Seeking and Creditworthiness on the Global Stage1

Abstract

Just as status generates inequalities between organizations and individuals, it also structures relations among states in the global field. In an effort to elevate their status vis‐à‐vis peers, states pursue a range of status‐seeking strategies. This article asks whether states that invest more heavily in these strategies are rewarded by relevant global audiences and receive tangible material benefits. To examine this question, I study two prominent status displays—bidding to host the Olympic Games and holding a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—and analyze their relationship with upgrades in sovereign credit ratings. I find that Olympic bidders and UNSC members are 10% more likely to receive a rating upgrade within two years. Further analyses reveal that these rewards disproportionately accrue to “overachievers” who are distinct from the typical members of these elite clubs: large, upper‐middle‐income states for Olympic bidding and small states for the UNSC. To explain these findings, I propose that in a highly uncertain market environment status displays bolster impressions of states' creditworthiness by signaling a commitment to international cooperation and obligations. The study contributes to our understanding of how status shapes global inequalities, and demonstrates that status‐seeking actions yield concrete material rewards.