Abstract
This study considers a voting rule wherein each player sincerely votes when he/she has no information about the preferences of the other players. We introduce the concept of rank-dominant strategies to discuss the situation where a player is completely ignorant and decision theoretic justification of the concept. We show that under the plurality voting rule with the equal probability random tie-breaking, sincere voting is always a player's rank-dominant strategy. We also discuss other scoring rules and show that sincere voting may not follow a rank-dominant strategy even with the equal probability random tie-breaking.
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