Randomness and diversity matter in the maintenance of the public resources

Abstract

Most previous models about the public goods game usually assume two possible strategies, i.e., investing all or nothing. The real-life situation is rarely all or nothing. In this paper, we consider that multiple strategies are adopted in a well-mixed population, and each strategy represents an investment to produce the public goods. Past efforts have found that randomness matters in the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game. In the framework involving no other mechanisms, we study how diversity and randomness influence the average investment of the population defined by the mean value of all individuals' strategies. The level of diversity is increased by increasing the strategy number, and the level of randomness is increased by increasing the mutation probability, or decreasing the population size or the selection intensity. We find that a higher level of diversity and a higher level of randomness lead to larger average investment and favor more the evolution of cooperation. Under weak selection, the average investment changes very little with the strategy number, the population size, and the mutation probability. Under strong selection, the average investment changes very little with the strategy number and the population size, but changes a lot with the mutation probability. Under intermediate selection, the average investment increases significantly with the strategy number and the mutation probability, and decreases significantly with the population size. These findings are meaningful to study how to maintain the public resource.