Randomized Arguments are Transferable

Abstract

Easwaran has given a definition of transferability and argued that, under this definition, randomized arguments are not transferable. I show that certain aspects of his definition are not suitable for addressing the underlying question of whether or not there is an epistemic distinction between randomized and deductive arguments. Furthermore, I demonstrate that for any suitable definition, randomized arguments are in fact transferable. Kenny Easwaran [Easwaran2008] has recently given a definition of transferability of mathematical proofs and has attempted to use this notion to epistemically differentiate between traditional deductive proofs and certain inductive arguments based on randomized trials (which I will call randomized arguments; more on this below). However, I will show that there are problems with Easwaran’s definition and further demonstrate that, for any suitable definition of the term, transferability does not epistemically distinguish between deductive proofs and randomized arguments.