Abstract
R&D strategic interaction was analyzed in two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing firm (PMF) and labor-managed firm (LMF). By developing a two-stage game model of duopoly between PMF and LMF, we explore their production and R&D investment response curves of strategic interaction in Cournot competition. With comparative static analysis, we determined impacts of changes in their own and rivalpsilas R&D, wages, fixed costs on its optimal outputs respectively, and impacts of changes in their own and rivalpsilas R&D spillovers on optimal R&D level. Results showed there were some difference between LMF and PMF in the production and R&D investments.
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