Abstract

Ramón Magsaysay became a phenomenon in Philippine politics after World War ii. In less than a decade, he rose from managing a bus company to governing his homeland. Magsaysay died tragically in a plane crash near the end of his only term as president and students of Philippine affairs have been left to speculate about what might have been a different subsequent course of affairs in this Southeast Asian nation. This paper argues that the so-called “Magsaysay Myth”—the idea that the United States installed him in office to transform his country’s government and politics—is not convincing. u.s. policy makers with experience in the Philippines, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower, remained skeptical that he could achieve fundamental change in his country in a short period of time. Despite Magsaysay’s great success as secretary of defense, he was less effective enacting reforms as president. However, he did not “sellout” to the Philippine economic and political elite. Rather, his relative ineffectiveness resulted from his lack of political experience and the well-organized opposition to reforms in the legislature.

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