Abstract
The growing theoretical literature on mechanism design and especially on the allocation of indivisible resources has created the need for experimental testing of mechanisms that evolved from matching theory in order to investigate the mechanisms’ theoretical properties in practice. The collection of mechanisms offered by this package includes Deferred Acceptance, Gale’s Top Trading Cycles and the Boston Mechanism in the context of School Choice Problems and the University of Michigan Bidding System, the Gale–Shapley Pareto-Dominant Market Mechanism, and Random Serial Dictatorship in the context of multi-unit resource allocation. All standalone apps are easy to use, customizable for many purposes, and are implemented in the oTree framework.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
