Abstract

The primary aim of the present work was to determine the inventories of the radionuclides and stable elements in vitrified high-level waste produced at La Hague and delivered to Germany, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive wastes. For a subset of these radionuclides and stable elements, the inventories were determined — either by direct measurements or by involving established correlations — and reported by AREVA. This allowed verification of the validity of application of a model approach utilizing the data of burnup and activation calculations and auxiliary information on the reprocessing and vitrification process operated at La Hague. Having proved that such a model approach can be applied for prediction of inventories of actinides, fission and activation products in vitrified waste, the present work estimated the minimum, average and maximum inventories of the radionuclides, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive waste but were not reported by AREVA for delivered CSD-V canisters. The average and maximum inventories in individual CSD-V canisters predicted in the present approach were compared to the inventories predicted by Nagra for canisters with vitrified waste delivered from La Hague to Switzerland [1]. This comparison revealed a number of differences between these inventories despite the fact that the canisters delivered to Switzerland were produced in essentially the same way and from the common reprocessing waste stock as CSD-V canisters delivered to Germany. Therefore, a further work is required in order to identify the reason for the discrepancy in the present estimation versus the Nagra estimation [1]. Such a work should also address the recommendation by the international peer review of the Safety Report of the Project Opalinus Clay to obtain estimates of the inventories of long-lived mobile radionuclides (such as 14C, 36Cl, 79Se, and 129I), which contribute most to the dose estimates in the radiological safety assessments, if possible, in agreement with other countries with similar waste streams in order for a coordinated set of data to be generated [2]. Since vitrified waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at La Hague was delivered to several countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland — an international effort can be recommended.

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