Radio Free Europe’s Impact on the Kremlin in the Hungarian Crisis of 1956: Three Hypotheses

Abstract

This article will expose incendiary Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts hitherto uncited, and juxtapose chronologically for the first time documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and US archives in recent years to show more clearly how US psychological warfare and RFE broadcasts may have influenced Soviet decision-making during the 1956 Hungarian crisis. While wholly indisputable evidence remains to be found, the sequence of events does suggest that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) — namely “Operation Focus” — both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, may have caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Certainly RFE did not actually “cause” the Hungarian Revolution itself. The insurgents would be insulted if anyone suggested that some foreign radio station had caused their revolution. Yet — while incontrovertible evidence is still lacking — new documents strongly indicate that the radio broadcasts did probably contribute to the Soviet crackdown on 4 November 1956. The Americans’ premature distrust of Imre Nagy perhaps points to a larger pattern of bias in US foreign policy during the Cold War: a fundamental prejudice toward communist leaders. Just as Soviet officials were blind to the concept of neutrality, so Eisenhower and other US policymakers in the 1950s appeared blind to the existence of scrupulous, reform-minded communists.