Radically questioning the principle of the least restrictive alternative: a reply to Nir Eyal: Comment on "Nudging by Shaming, Shaming by Nudging".

Yashar Saghai

doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2014.106

Abstract

In his insightful editorial, Nir Eyal explores the connections between nudging and shaming. One upshot of his argument is that we should question the principle of the least restrictive alternative in public health and health policy. In this commentary, I maintain that Eyal's argument undermines only a rather implausible version of the principle of the least restrictive alternative and I sketch two reasons for rejecting the mainstream and more plausible version of this principle.

Highlights

Nir Eyal explores the connections between nudging and shaming. One upshot of his argument is that we should question the principle of the least restrictive alternative in public health and health policy
A proponent of Premise 1 would conclude that the opt-out approach is preferable to the impartial approach because it is less restrictive of personal liberties
Eyal assumes that proponents of the mainstream version of PLRA would disagree with him and claim that A is preferable to B

Summary

Introduction

A proponent of Premise 1 would conclude that the opt-out (nudge) approach is preferable to the impartial (non-nudge) approach because it is less restrictive of personal liberties. According to Eyal, the impartial approach is preferable to the opt-out approach because at least another morally relevant consideration tips the balance the other way, namely, the propensity of an intervention to elicit shame (minimally understood as embarrassment). Eyal argues that if A and B are two efficacious and effective interventions, and if A elicits unintended and undesirable shame, B is preferable to A, A might be less restrictive than B.

Results

Conclusion