‘Radical Individualism’ vs. Institutionalism, II: Philosophical Dualisms as Apologetic Constructs Based on Obsolete Psychological Preconceptions

Abstract

Abstract. David Seckler, in his study of Veblen and the institutionalists, adopted a viewpoint which is a philosophical orientation least likely to enable him to know what Veblen and the institutionalists “really mean.” He accepted a pantheon of philosophical dualisms—e.g., “Humanism” vs. “behaviorism,”“normative” vs. “positive”— which Veblen and his followers reject, and particularly Mises's “methodological dualism” which would make science the study of ideal type individual actions instead of an experimental effort to understand the social processes of “cumulative causation” as they are found in the real world. Seckler's reliance on these obsolete psychological preconceptions of “radical individualism” causes him to neglect the powerful normative elements of Veblen's work. Yet it is precisely Veblen's normative methodology that gives rise to the “institutional dichotomy” in contemporary institutionalist thought.