Radical Evil and the Nature of Virtue

Abstract

Abstract This chapter situates Kant’s conception of virtue against the thesis of radical evil, according to which although human beings have a predisposition to virtue, they nevertheless have a propensity to moral evil. Section 1 of the chapter explains Kant’s conception of the “original predisposition to good” as presented in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Section 2 discusses the predispositions to moral feeling, conscience, love of humanity, and respect that Kant posits as presuppositions of being subject to moral requirements. The thesis of radical evil is explained in section 3. Kant’s concept of virtue is the topic of section 4, the propensities to evil (frailty, impurity, and depravity) are discussed in section 5, and in section 6 the task of acquiring virtue by overcoming affects and passions leading to moral evil is explained. The chapter ends with a brief comparison of Kant’s conception of virtue with Aristotle’s.