Abstract
Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) was a prominent German legal theorist, who, in the aftermath of World War II, famously argued that a sufficiently unjust rule loses its status as a valid legal norm. This article will consider whether Radbruch's post-war views, as encapsulated in his now-famous are best understood as a conceptual claim about law, or rather as (merely) a prescription for judicial decision-making. Part I outlines Radbruch's Formula, while also giving some context regarding Radbruch's general approach to legal theory, and how it changed over time. Part II considers whether the Formula is more charitably understood as a prescriptive theory of judicial decision-making rather than as a conceptual claim about law.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
