Abstract
This paper studies the Two-Person Zero Sum (TPZS) game between the radar and the extended target with the output Signal-to-Interference-pulse-Noise Ratio (SINR) being the payoff function. The radar player wants to maximize SINR by adjusting its transmit waveform under Peak to Average power Ratio (PAR) constraint. Conversely, the target player is intelligent to avoid being detected by controlling its Target Impulse Response (TIR) over a spherical set. It is proved theoretically that the Nash equilibrium exists for the Semi-Definite Relaxation (SDR) form of the TPZS game. Moreover, a first order iterative algorithm is introduced to find the equilibrium strategy. Numerical results highlight the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm as well as the designed waveform covariance.
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